Katharine Graham and The Washington Post
An unprepared successor, a prepared next generation

My professional insights · Lyudmil Karaulanov · 8 min read
Succession can begin before the family is ready for it. When the leading executive is suddenly absent, ownership, managerial authority and the ability to make decisions turn out to be three different questions. The story of Katharine Graham and The Washington Post Company shows two successive transitions: taking over management under the pressure of circumstances, and preparing the next generation years later.
The case develops the question from the analysis “Today the business runs well. But what if you are not there?” in the section Succession and generations: who can continue the work and what has to be prepared before that becomes necessary.
In 1946 the owner of The Washington Post, the financier Eugene Meyer, entrusted the management of the newspaper to his son-in-law Philip Graham. After Philip's death in 1963, his wife Katharine, Meyer's daughter, took over as president of the company. She was 46, had four children and had not worked regularly for almost two decades. She was to lead an organisation that by then included the newspaper, Newsweek magazine and three television stations. [1]
This is succession in the leadership of a family-controlled company. Taking up the post does not in itself mean that the experience, confidence and authority of the previous leader pass to the successor.
Graham gradually got to know the business and built her own team. In 1965 she brought in Ben Bradlee as managing editor, and in 1968 he became executive editor. The choice proved decisive for the development of the newspaper. [3]
In 1971 the company went public. Almost immediately Graham faced the decision whether The Washington Post should publish the Pentagon Papers. According to Thorndike's account, the legal advice did not give a clear answer, and the risk also affected the television business. She authorised publication and took responsibility for the decision. [1]
Over time Graham found people who complemented her own abilities. Berkshire Hathaway began buying shares in the company in 1973. The following year Warren Buffett joined the board and became an important adviser to her on capital allocation. The purchases and the subsequent development of the investment are also described in his 1985 letter to shareholders. [1, 4]
Another decisive choice was the appointment of Dick Simmons as chief operating officer in 1981. Thorndike notes that after several earlier attempts Graham found a person who improved the management of the individual businesses. In the following years the operating margins of the newspapers and television stations almost doubled. [1]
Graham also took an independent approach to capital. The company kept dividends low compared with its competitors, bought back a significant part of its own shares and refrained from expensive newspaper acquisitions during the period of high valuations. According to Thorndike's calculations, for the period from the 1971 public offering to her retirement as chairman of the board in 1993, the compound annual return to shareholders was 22.3%, compared with 7.4% for the S&P 500. [1]
For succession, however, what matters is how she prepared her own withdrawal. Donald Graham became publisher of the newspaper in 1979, chief executive officer of the company in 1991 and chairman of the board in 1993. Responsibilities were handed over gradually, while Katharine remained available. [2]
The preparation also covered the professional team. Alan Spoon succeeded Simmons as chief operating officer in 1991, and a next generation of managers took over key divisions. Thorndike highlights precisely this combination: a family successor and prepared executives around him. [1]
The analytical lesson is that a lack of preparation does not make a successor unable to succeed. It does, however, force the successor to learn, build authority and carry responsibility for decisions that cannot wait, all at the same time.
Katharine Graham gradually built the necessary confidence and judgement. An essential part of this process was her ability to choose advisers and executives she could trust, without shifting her own responsibility onto them.
In the next transition, preparation already preceded the withdrawal. Donald gained experience in different leadership positions, and the management team was also renewed. Succession thus covered more than the choice of one person.
The practical check begins with the question of who would take over management if the leading owner or executive could not continue tomorrow. What decisions does this person already take independently? Does this person know the team, the financial constraints and the relations with key partners? Who will help, and who will be able to challenge this person's judgement?
A separate question is what the family expects from the ownership. Is there an agreed understanding of the income it should provide and of the funds that may remain in the business? A change of leader often makes these differences more visible.
The counterpoint is that Graham's success does not prove that taking over management unprepared is an acceptable plan. Her personal qualities, the support of strong professionals and the specific opportunities before the company cannot be secured in advance in every family.
Family control also has two sides. It can give freedom for long-term decisions, but it can also make it harder to correct a wrong judgement. In this case the significance of Buffett, Simmons and the other executives lies precisely in the quality of the discussion and in the distribution of responsibilities.
Where is the point of instability?
The point of instability arises when the family knows who will own the business, but has not clarified who will run it, with what powers and with whose support. Acquiring ownership and taking up a managerial function do not automatically create the ability to manage.
There is an additional vulnerability when expectations of income from the ownership remain unspoken. A decision to retain profits may be justified for the company and at the same time difficult for family members who rely on those funds. Graham's story raises this question through the low dividend policy; it does not establish a specific family conflict over it.
- William N. Thorndike Jr., The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success, Harvard Business Review Press, 2012, chapter 5.
- The Washington Post, official corporate history
- Harvard Kennedy School, Shorenstein Center, biographical note on Benjamin Bradlee
- Berkshire Hathaway, letter to shareholders for 1985
- Further reading: Katharine Graham, Personal History, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.
Lyudmil Karaulanov, “Katharine Graham and The Washington Post”, Wealth Architecture, version 1.0, 2026
This material is of a general analytical nature and does not constitute individual legal, tax, financial or investment advice.
- Published
- 29 October 2026
- Version
- 1.0
Wealth Architecture · Publisher: Nautilex EOOD
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